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When an economy slumps, policymakers typically stimulate demand by
reducing short-term interest rates. Japan’s experience in the last decade has
renewed interest in an old question: what to do when rates can’t be lowered.
Weak demand has produced an output slump and deﬂation. But short-
term rates cannot fall because they are already at their lower bound of zero.
Japan has experienced this “liquidity trap” since 1998. Can policy still
stimulate demand?
The textbook remedy for a liquidity trap is a ﬁscal expansion. Japanese
policy is complicated, however, by a large and rising government debt. This
problem led the major rating agencies to downgrade Japan’s debt in 2002.
Policymakers resist a ﬁscal expansion because they believe it would exac-
erbate the debt problem.
Others, however, argue for a ﬁscal expansion. Kuttner and Posen (2001)
suggest that this policy would not only boost output but also have benign
eﬀects on Japan’s debt problem. They argue that Japan’s large budget deﬁ-
cits have mainly been caused by its output slump. By ending the slump, a
ﬁscal expansion would eventually raise tax revenues, and higher inﬂation
would reduce the real value of debt. These eﬀects would oﬀset the direct
costs of a ﬁscal expansion.
Several advocates of a ﬁscal expansion suggest a twist: money ﬁnance
(e.g., Mankiw 1999; Stevens 2001). They advocate a “helicopter drop” of
money—or, equivalently, a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion coupled with
purchases of the new debt by the central bank. Monetization of the debt
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sociate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.would eliminate the direct ﬁscal costs of the policy, leaving only the bene-
ﬁts from economic stimulus. Bernanke (2003) summarizes the argument
for a money-ﬁnanced tax cut:
Isn’t it irresponsible to recommend a tax cut, given the poor state of
Japanese public ﬁnances? To the contrary, from a ﬁscal perspective, the
policy would almost certainly be stabilizing, in the sense of reducing the
debt-to-GDP ratio. The BOJ’s purchases would leave the nominal quan-
tity of debt in the hands of the public unchanged, while nominal GDP
would rise owing to increased nominal spending. Indeed, nothing would
help reduce Japan’s ﬁscal woes more than healthy growth in nominal
GDP and hence in tax revenues.
This paper examines these ideas. It uses a textbook-style macromodel
calibrated to ﬁt the Japanese economy. The model’s initial conditions are
based on the situation in 2003. I determine the ﬁscal transfer needed to
boost output to potential, and derive the eﬀects over time on output, inﬂa-
tion, and the debt-income ratio. I compare results for a bond-ﬁnanced
transfer, a money-ﬁnanced transfer, and a baseline case with passive ﬁscal
policy. In most exercises, I assume monetary policy follows a Taylor rule
once interest rates become positive.
The results are generally favorable to ﬁscal expansions. For base param-
eter values, a transfer of 6.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) re-
turns output to potential in the following year, and thereafter only small
transfers are needed to keep it there. The output recovery ends deﬂation,
and the interest rate becomes positive; then the Taylor rule guides the
economy to a steady state with low positive inﬂation. If the ﬁscal transfer
is ﬁnanced with bonds, the debt-income ratio jumps up when the transfer
occurs, but then it falls as output and inﬂation rise. Two years after the
transfer, the debt-income ratio falls below its level under passive policy, and
it remains lower in steady state. Thus the transfer improves the long-run ﬁs-
cal situation as well as ending the output slump.
Does it matter if the ﬁscal expansion is ﬁnanced with money rather than
debt? Money ﬁnance prevents the debt-income ratio from jumping up when
the transfer occurs. For base parameter values, this ratio remains lower
with money ﬁnance than with debt ﬁnance for nine years. In year ten, how-
ever, the debt paths under the two policies converge. The initial ﬁnancing of
the transfer is irrelevant in the long run.
These results arise because the Taylor rule becomes operative in year ten.
In that year the central bank sets a positive interest rate, which requires a
contraction of the monetary base. It reduces the base by selling government
bonds. The necessary contraction is larger if the initial transfer was money
ﬁnanced, and the extra sales of debt oﬀset the initial savings from moneti-
zation.
The rest of this paper contains seven sections. Section 7.2 presents addi-
tional background and Section 7.3 presents the model. Sections 7.4–7.8 de-
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Figure 7.1 presents annual data on Japan’s economy from 1990 to 2003.
I use the experience of this period to guide my modeling of the economy.
The situation in 2003 is summarized in table 7.1. In simulating alternative
policies, I use data from 2003 as initial conditions.
Panel A of ﬁgure 7.1 shows the log of real output. Output growth aver-
aged 1.3 percent per year over 1990–2003, compared to 4.0 percent from
1980 to 1990. Early in the slump, some blamed it on slow growth of poten-
tial output due to “structural” factors. Today, however, most economists
agree that output has fallen below potential because of deﬁcient demand.
Apparent demand shocks include a collapse in asset prices, a credit crunch,
and policy mistakes (e.g., Hoshi and Kashyap 2004; Posen 2003).
There is, of course, uncertainty about the gap between output and po-
tential output. Following McCallum (2000) and Hoshi-Kashyap, ﬁgure 7.1
presents a path for potential based on the assumption that it has grown 2
percent per year since 1990. This approach produces an output gap of –9
percent in 2003. Using production functions, some researchers have esti-
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Fig. 7.1 Japan’s slump: A, output; B, inﬂation; C, short-term interest rate; 
D, monetary base/GDP
C D
B Amated recent gaps of around –5 percent (e.g. Ahearne et al. 2002; Leigh
2004). In my simulations, I assume an initial output gap of –7.5 percent).
Figure 7.1 also shows inﬂation, as measured by the GDP deﬂator and by
core Consumer Price Index (CPI). The slump of the 90s dragged inﬂation
down, as predicted by the accelerationist Phillips curve. In 2000, inﬂation
reached about –1 percent (a bit higher for the CPI and a bit lower for the
deﬂator). Since then, inﬂation has remained fairly constant. I use –1 per-
cent as the initial value of inﬂation.
The stability of inﬂation since 2000 is not consistent with a conventional
Phillips curve. Such an equation predicts accelerating deﬂation when the
output gap is negative. The cause of this anomaly is unclear, but Blanchard
(2000) suggests one possibility. The accelerationist Phillips curve is based
on the assumption that expected inﬂation equals past inﬂation. This rela-
tion breaks down if people view deﬂation as transitory—if they expect a
return to nonnegative inﬂation. In this case, an output slump causes deﬂa-
tion but not accelerating deﬂation. I will incorporate this idea in the chap-
ter’s model.1
Panels C and D of ﬁgure 7.1 show the behavior of monetary policy. The
Bank of Japan (BOJ) responded to the slump and falling inﬂation by cut-
ting the short-term interest rate. Leigh (2004) shows that a conventional
Taylor rule captures this behavior up to 1998. At that point, the Taylor-rule
interest rate became negative, and the actual rate hit the zero bound. The
interest rate has stayed close to zero since then.
The monetary base grew steadily as the interest rate fell. Base growth ac-
celerated under the policy of “quantitative easing,” which entailed large
open market operations. The base grew 26 percent in 2002 and 16 percent
in 2003, reaching 20 percent of GDP. With the interest rate stuck at zero,
this monetary expansion did not have obvious eﬀects on output or inﬂa-
tion. This experience is consistent with a textbook liquidity trap.
7.2.2 A Fiscal Solution?
The classic solution to a liquidity trap is a ﬁscal expansion. However,
Japanese policymakers are reluctant to try this policy, for two reasons.
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Nominal interest rate 0
Base/GDP 0.20
Debt/GDP 0.79
1. Econometric research suggests that the Japanese Phillips curve broke down sometime in
the 1990s. See Fukao (2004).First, many argue that ﬁscal policy is ineﬀective in raising output. Second,
they fear that a ﬁscal expansion would exacerbate the problem of a grow-
ing national debt.
This chapter rejects the ﬁrst reason. It is based on the view that Japan
tried ﬁscal expansions in the 1990s without success (e.g., Friedman 2001).
This view has been debunked by Posen (1998) and Kuttner and Posen
(2001). They show that several “expansion” programs failed because they
were not really expansions—they consisted mainly of normal expenditures.
There were large ﬁscal deﬁcits, but these mainly reﬂected revenue losses
caused by the slump. In periods of true ﬁscal loosening, such as 1995, out-
put responded.
Kuttner and Posen also estimate multipliers for ﬁscal policy in Japan.
They use the structural VAR approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
which controls for the cyclical behavior of deﬁcits. Kuttner and Posen ﬁnd
that a 100 yen tax cut raises output one year later by about 125 yen.
This chapter will worry more about the second objection to ﬁscal ex-
pansion: its eﬀects on Japan’s public debt. Figure 7.2 shows the path of net
government debt as a percent of GDP. This ratio rose from 0.13 in 1991 to
0.79 in 2003, and forecasters predict that it will continue to rise. Long-term
budget projections are bleak because of Japan’s aging population. Many
analysts fear an eventual ﬁscal crisis, possibly even default. As a result,
Japan’s debt has been downgraded to A2/AA–, the level for many develop-
ing countries.2
This chapter will look for policies that end Japan’s slump without wors-
ening its debt problem. I will ask whether a ﬁscal transfer can do so—
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Fig. 7.2 Rising debt
2. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
Japan’s gross government debt for 2003 was 157 percent of GDP and government assets were
78 percent, yielding net debt of 79 percent. Broda and Weinstein (2004) suggest two adjust-
ments to this ﬁgure. Like this chapter, they view the government and the central bank as thewhether the ﬁscal beneﬁts from higher output and inﬂation outweigh the
direct costs of the transfer. I will also consider the eﬀects of ﬁnancing the
transfer with money rather than bonds.
7.3 The Model
Japan’s problems are largely explained by textbook macromodels. A fall
in aggregate demand has reduced output, and monetary policy is ineﬀec-
tive because the interest rate has hit zero. Kuttner and Posen say “the basic
lesson of Japan’s Great Recession for policymakers is to trust what you
learned in intermediate macroeconomics class.” In that spirit, I study a
model with textbook equations such as an IS curve and a money-demand
function. I add simple dynamics following Svensson (1997) and Ball
(1999). The only unorthodox equation is the Phillips curve, which is mod-
iﬁed to capture Japan’s steady deﬂation.
7.3.1 Assumptions
Output: Potential output Y∗ grows by g percent per year. Actual output
Y deviates from potential according to an IS equation:
(1)      (rt 1   r∗
t 1)     
where t indexes years, G is real transfers from the government, r is the real
interest rate, r∗ is the “neutral” interest rate, and all parameters are posi-
tive. The real rate r is i –  , where i is the nominal rate and   is inﬂation. In
words, the output gap depends on the lagged gap, the lagged real interest
rate, and lagged transfers. The one-year lags are consistent with Japanese
evidence (see Kuttner and Posen 2001).
Inﬂation:Inﬂation is determined by an expectations-augmented Phillips
curve:
(2)  t    t
e   ,
where  e is expected inﬂation. A conventional assumption is that expected
inﬂation equals lagged inﬂation,  t
e    t–1. I assume instead that
(3)  t
e   max{ t 1, 0}.
The conventional assumption holds when lagged inﬂation is nonnegative,
but expectations do not follow actual inﬂation below zero. When  t–1   0,
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same entity, and thus subtract government bonds owned by the central bank. This reduces net
debt by 16 percent of GDP. Second, they add bad loans from the government to the private
sector, which by coincidence are also 16 percent of GDP. The two adjustments cancel, so net
debt is still 79 percent.equations (2) and (3) imply that output determines the change in inﬂation.
When  t–1   0, output determines the level of inﬂation, as suggested by
Blanchard.
Section 7.7 replaces equation (3) with the assumption that  t
e always
equals  t–1. This change does not greatly aﬀect the economy’s response to
ﬁscal expansions. It does change the baseline case with passive ﬁscal pol-
icy. If  t
e    t–1 and policy is passive, the economy falls into a spiral of ac-
celerating deﬂation.
Money: The central bank controls the stock of base money, M, through
open market operations. Money evolves according to
(4) Mt   Mt 1   Zt,
where Z is central-bank purchases of government bonds (Z   0 means
sales of bonds). The demand for base money is given by
(5) ln     k    it, it   0;
  k, it   0,
where P is the price level. This equation imposes a unit income elasticity 
of money demand (which is consistent with Japanese data). At positive in-
terest rates, there is a constant interest rate semi-elasticity; at a zero inter-
est rate, money demand becomes ﬂat. Figure 7.3shows the money-demand
function in a graph.3
Debt: I measure Japan’s ﬁscal problem with privately-held debt, which
excludes debt held by the central bank. Thus I ignore the separate balance
sheets of the government and central bank and treat them as one entity.
Nominal debt Dt evolves according to
(6) Dt   Dt 1   it 1Dt 1   P tGt   Zt    (P tY t   P tYt ∗).
Debt is past debt plus changes from four sources: interest payments on the
past debt; current nominal transfers; open market purchases, which reduce
debt; and a term for the government’s primary surplus in the absence of
transfers. This surplus is assumed to be zero when output equals potential
(Y t   Yt ∗). It varies procyclically when output ﬂuctuates.4
In reality, Japan’s primary surplus would probably be negative even if
output were at potential. Ignoring this fact helps us isolate the eﬀects of ex-
Mt  
P tY t
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3. It is common to specify a demand function like equation (5) for M1 rather than the mon-
etary base. This would not aﬀect the analysis if one assumes a constant ratio of M1 to the base
(i.e., a constant money multiplier). This multiplier is fairly stable in Japan.
4. Equation (6) implicitly assumes that government debt has a maturity of one year. In re-
ality, much of Japan’s debt is long term. Adding long-term debt to the model would strengthen
the case for ﬁscal expansion. As shown below, an expansion raises the path of interest rates.
Higher rates imply capital losses for holders of long-term debt, which are capital gains for the
government.ogenous ﬁscal expansions. Section 7.7 extends the model to include a pri-
mary deﬁcit when Y   Y∗.
7.3.2 Calibration
Table 7.2 presents base values for the model’s parameters. Section 7.7
considers robustness to changes in these parameters.
In the IS equation, I set  , the coeﬃcient on the real interest rate, to 1.0.
This follows Ball’s (1999) calibration for the United States (I have not found
Japanese evidence). For the other IS parameters, I use Kuttner and Posen’s
econometric results. They estimate that  , the eﬀect of lagged transfers on
output, is 1.25 and  , the eﬀect of lagged output, is 0.6. The eﬀect of trans-
fers is smaller than Blanchard and Perotti’s estimates for the United States.5
I also use Kuttner and Posen’s estimate of  , the eﬀect of output on the
primary surplus. They ﬁnd   0.25. This appears conservative, as taxes
are 20 percent of Japanese output and marginal taxes are higher than av-
erage taxes.
The Phillips curve slope,  , is 0.2. This estimate comes from studies at the
BOJ (e.g., Hirose and Kamada 2002). The Phillips curve appears ﬂatter in
Japan than in the United States, where   is often estimated around 0.4.
In the money-demand equation, the interest rate semi-elasticity,  , is 0.1,
based on estimates by Fujiki, Hsiao, and Shen (2002), and Miyao (2002).
The parameter k is the point at which the money-demand curve hits an in-
terest rate of zero. I calibrate it using the historical evidence in ﬁgure 7.1.
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Fig. 7.3 Money demand
5. More precisely, Kuttner and Posen estimate an equation for log output, and get a coeﬃ-
cient of –0.25 on log taxes. Dividing by the ratio of taxes to GDP (approximately 0.2) yields
the yen-for-yen eﬀect of taxes and transfers on output.When the interest rate reached zero in 1998, the ratio of the monetary base
to GDP was about 0.1. This implies k   ln(0.1).
The growth rate of potential output, g, is 2 percent per year.
7.3.3 The Neutral Interest Rate
It remains to calibrate the neutral real interest rate, r∗. This is a thorny
issue. There is debate about whether this parameter is positive or negative
in Japan (e.g. Krugman 2000). My view is that r∗ is currently negative, but
unlikely to stay negative forever. My calibration will capture this idea.
The neutral interest rate is the one that produces Y   Y∗ in the absence
of a ﬁscal expansion. It seems clear that r∗ has been negative in the early
2000s. The actual real rate has been about 1 percent and Y has been far be-
low Y∗. Thus r∗ must be well below 1 percent. I assume an initial r∗ of –2
percent, which implies r – r∗   3 percent. For this value of r – r∗, the out-
put gap converges to –7.5 percent if there is no ﬁscal transfer. Thus the cal-
ibration captures the idea that output is stuck at a low level.
It is unlikely, however, that r∗ will stay negative forever. Iwamura, Mit-
suru, and Watanabe (2004), and Leigh (2004) estimate that r∗ was well
above zero before the 1990s, but fell during the 90s slump. The fall in r∗
means the IS curve shifted in. This shift reﬂected adverse demand shocks,
such as the credit crunch and fall in conﬁdence. It is likely that these prob-
lems will someday abate. Eventually, a cleanup of banking may spur
greater lending. Or a recovery due to external demand will raise conﬁdence
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bGrows linearly to year 10.and improve balance sheets. Whatever the reason, the IS curve will shift
back out and r∗ will return to a positive level.
I assume that r∗ eventually rises to  2 percent. Of course it is hard to
guess how quickly this will happen. In the base speciﬁcation, I assume that
r∗ rises linearly from –2 percent to  2 percent over ten years. The IS curve
shifts outward, but slowly. Since this assumption is arbitrary, variations on
the r∗ path are a top priority among robustness checks.
7.4 A Baseline Case
This section derives the path of the economy if there is no ﬁscal expan-
sion: Gt   0 for all t. The economy starts in year zero with the initial con-
ditions in table 7.2. This exercise provides a baseline for measuring the
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy.
7.4.1 Monetary Policy
To close the model, I must specify the behavior of monetary policy. I as-
sume an interest rate rule based on the past behavior of the Bank of Japan.
Recall that the BOJ appeared to follow a Taylor rule until the interest rate
hit zero. This behavior is captured by
(7) it   max{it
T, 0},
it
T   rt ∗    t    b( t    ∗),
where  ∗ is an inﬂation target. The variable iT is the interest rate dictated
by a Taylor rule: it depends on the output gap and inﬂation. The BOJ sets
an interest rate of iT if iT is positive, and zero if iT is negative. BOJ oﬃcials
have suggested the same rule in describing their policy (Baba et al. 2004).
When the rule delivers a positive interest rate, the money-demand equa-
tion determines M. M and lagged M determine open market purchases, Z.
When i 0, Mis not determined by the rule, because money demand is ﬂat.
In this case, I make the additional assumption that Z   0, so M equals
lagged M. That is, I assume the BOJ does not pursue open market opera-
tions if they do not aﬀect the interest rate. (Section 7.6 examines an alter-
native assumption.)
In the Taylor rule, the coeﬃcients a and b are chosen as follows. Taylor
rules with certain parameters are equivalent to “ﬂexible” inﬂation target-
ing: a policy that returns inﬂation to  ∗ at a ﬁxed rate (see Svensson [1997]
and Ball [1999] for proofs in similar models). I assume that inﬂation moves
halfway to its target each period. One can show that this implies a   1.1
and b   2.5.
a(Y t   Yt ∗)
  
Yt ∗
288 Laurence BallI assume the inﬂation target  ∗ is 2 percent, which is close to the targets
of many countries.
Given initial conditions and the policy rule, it is straightforward to de-
rive the evolution of the economy. Each period, Yand  are determined by
past conditions through equations (1)–(3). Inﬂation  determines the price
level P. The policy rule determines i, M, and Z, as described above. Finally,
equation (6) determines D.
7.4.2 Results
Figure 7.4 shows the paths of some key variables: the output gap,  , i,
and the ratios of Z, M, and D to GDP. Starting from period zero, output
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Fig. 7.4 Baseline case: output gap; inﬂation; nominal interest rate; OMO/GDP;
monetary base/GDP; debt/GDPstays in a deep slump for several years and then slowly recovers as r∗ in-
creases. The output gap rises above –5 percent in year six, and it becomes
positive in year ten. From years one to nine, there is a cumulative output
gap of –54 percent.
Inﬂation falls to –1.5 percent and then inches up as the economy recov-
ers. It becomes positive in year eleven. Through that year the Taylor rule
prescribes a negative interest rate, so i is stuck at zero.
In year twelve, the recovery pushes the Taylor-rule interest rate above
zero. The rule begins to operate, and it guides inﬂation smoothly to the tar-
get of 2 percent. Output temporarily overshoots potential as inﬂation rises.
While the interest rate is zero, the money stock is constant and nominal
GDP grows (the growth in Y exceeds the fall in P). The money-GDP ratio
declines slowly. In year twelve, when the interest rate becomes positive, the
money-GDP ratio falls by more than half. This occurs through a large
monetary contraction: open market purchases, Z, are –8 percent of GDP.
This action is needed because of the high level of money at the start of the
simulation. Although the money-GDP ratio falls in years one to eleven, it
remains far above the level that produces a positive interest rate. Thus a
large money absorption is needed when the Taylor rule takes eﬀect.
The debt-income ratio rises initially, because the output slump produces
primary deﬁcits. The ratio peaks at 0.85 in year ﬁve, then falls as the econ-
omy recovers. It jumps up in year twelve, when the large monetary con-
traction occurs. The BOJ’s sales of government bonds raise the level of
privately-held debt.
In steady state, the debt-income ratio falls slowly. The primary deﬁcit is
zero, and interest payments are balanced by income growth, since r   g  
2 percent. The fall in the debt ratio results from seignorage revenue, as Z 
0 in steady state. The ratio reaches 0.77 in year twenty-ﬁve.
7.5 A Bond-Financed Fiscal Expansion
This section examines how a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion changes the
evolution of the economy.
7.5.1 The Policy
In this experiment, interest rate policy is the same as before: i   max{iT,
0}. And once again, Z   0 when i   0.
However, this policy is now accompanied by ﬁscal transfers. These trans-
fers add to government debt through equation (6). The transfers begin in
year one; given the lag in the IS curve, they start aﬀecting output in year
two. The transfers are chosen to end the slump quickly and permanently:
the output gap is nonnegative in years two, three, ....   Each period, the
government makes the smallest transfer suﬃcient to achieve this result.
290 Laurence BallTo state this policy formally, let Gt ∗be the real transfer that produces Y t 1
 Y∗
t 1. Gt ∗can be computed from the IS curve given the state at t. The rule
for transfers is
(8) Gt   max{Gt ∗, 0}, t   1.
If a positive transfer is needed to keep output at potential, it is made. If a
negative transfer would keep output at potential, no transfer is made. In
this case, output exceeds potential.
7.5.2 The Path of Transfers
Figure 7.5 shows the series of ﬁscal transfers implied by equation (8). In
year one, the transfer is 6.6 percent of output (Y), or 6.1 percent of poten-
tial output (Y∗). Given the multiplier of 1.25, this transfer is needed to pro-
duce a zero output gap in period two, rather than the –7.6 percent gap of
the baseline case. The transfer is 2.2 percent of output in year two, less than
1 percent in years three and four, and zero thereafter. The necessary trans-
fer peters out because r – r∗ falls, stimulating spending. (The real rate falls
because   rises, and r∗ rises by assumption.) The cumulative transfer over
years one through four is 9.4 percent of output.
This ﬁscal expansion is large by historical standards, but not gigantic.
Over the 1990s, Japan experienced a series of changes in taxes and govern-
ment spending (Kuttner and Posen 2001). Several of these shifts amounted
to 2 percent of GDP or more; a 1998 stimulus package was 4 percent. The
total eﬀect of ﬁscal policy was small, because expansions in some years
were oﬀset by contractions in others (such as the 1997 tax increase). The
key diﬀerence between the transfers proposed here and recent practice is
that policy pushes consistently in one direction.
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Fig. 7.5 The ﬁscal expansion7.5.3 Eﬀects of the Transfers
Figure 7.6 shows the eﬀects of ﬁscal transfers. It compares the econ-
omy’s path under the transfer rule (8) (the dashed line) to the baseline case
without transfers (the solid line). By construction, the transfers return out-
put to potential in period two; most of the long slump in the baseline case
is eliminated. The faster recovery implies that inﬂation and the interest rate
start rising sooner than before. Nonetheless, the Taylor rule guides the
economy to the same steady state, with 2 percent inﬂation.
The large transfer in period one causes the debt-income ratio to jump up:
it reaches 0.87, compared to 0.81 in the baseline case. After that the ratio
falls rapidly as the transfers fuel growth and inﬂation. In year two, the debt-
income ratio with transfers (0.825) is very close to the ratio in the baseline
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Fig. 7.6 Eﬀects of ﬁscal expansion: output gap; inﬂation; nominal interest rate;
OMO/GDP; monetary base/GDP; debt/GDPcase (0.824); in year three, the ratio with transfers falls below the baseline
case. It remains lower in all future years, except for year eleven when it is
slightly higher. (The result for year eleven reﬂects the fact that the nominal
interest rate rises earlier with transfers. The jump in debt from the neces-
sary monetary contraction occurs sooner.)
In steady state the debt-income ratio falls slowly in both the baseline case
and the case with transfers. However, the path of the ratio is lower with
transfers. In year twenty-ﬁve, the ratio is 0.72 with transfers and 0.77 with-
out them. Thus the transfers produce a win-win: they end the output slump
quickly and they improve the long-run ﬁscal situation.
To better understand these results, note that the cumulative output gap
in the baseline case is –44 percent of potential output. The cumulative gap
with transfers is –5 percent, so the transfers raise output by a total of 39
percent of potential. The eﬀect of output on government revenue,  , is 0.25;
thus revenue rises by (0.25)39 percent   9.8 percent of potential output.
This gain more than oﬀsets the initial transfers, which total 9.4 percent of
potential. The transfers also reduce the debt-income ratio by raising inﬂa-
tion. Inﬂation reaches zero in period three, while it stays negative through
period ten in the baseline case. The faster rise in inﬂation reduces real in-
terest rates on the debt.
7.6 A Money-Financed Fiscal Expansion
This section considers ﬁscal transfers ﬁnanced by printing money rather
than issuing debt. I ask whether money ﬁnance produces lower debt-
income ratios, as suggested by Bernanke and others.
7.6.1 The Policy
In this experiment, the ﬁscal transfers are the same as before (see the path
in ﬁgure 7.5). There are positive transfers in years one through four. The gov-
ernment ﬁnances the transfers by issuing bonds and the central bank buys
the bonds. The central bank’s purchases equal the nominal level of transfers:
(9) Zt   P tGt, t   1, . . . , 4.
These actions raise the money stock by the amount of the transfers, and
leave privately-held debt unchanged. Thus they are equivalent to a heli-
copter drop of money.
After year four, monetary policy behaves as in the previous experiments.
Open market purchases are zero until the Taylor rule prescribes a positive
interest rate, and then this rule determines policy.
7.6.2 Results
The ﬁscal multiplier does not depend on how transfers are ﬁnanced. Thus
switching from debt to money ﬁnance does not change the path of output.
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curve and Taylor rule are unchanged. The only changes are in open market
operations, the money stock, and debt. Figure 7.7 shows the paths of these
variables. It compares the case of money-ﬁnanced transfers (the dotted
lines) to the cases of bond-ﬁnanced transfers and no transfers.
When the transfers are money ﬁnanced, the money-income ratio jumps
up in year one. In contrast to the case of bond ﬁnance, the debt-income ra-
tio does notrise sharply. In years one through nine, the money-income ratio
is higher with money ﬁnance, and the debt-income ratio is lower by the
same amount. Policymakers have substituted money for debt.
Things change in year ten, when the Taylor rule becomes operative. As
before, contractionary open market operations are needed to reduce money
to the level consistent with the Taylor rule. The necessary open market sales
are larger in the case of money-ﬁnanced transfers, because the money-
income ratio is higher in year nine. The extra sales of debt raise the debt-
income ratio to its path in the bond-ﬁnance case. In other words, the mon-
etization of debt in years one through four is reversed in year ten: money is
turned back into debt. Starting in year ten, the initial ﬁnancing of transfers
is irrelevant to all variables in the model.
In light of these results, does it matter how transfers are initially ﬁnanced?
Monetization has no eﬀect on output or inﬂation, and no long-run eﬀect on
debt. However, it prevents the jump in the debt-income ratio that occurs in
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Fig. 7.7 Money-ﬁnance versus debt-ﬁnance: monetary base/GDP; OMO/GDP;
debt/GDPyear one if transfers are debt ﬁnanced. With money ﬁnance, the debt-
income ratio never signiﬁcantly exceeds its level in the baseline case. Thus
monetization matters if we care about the short-run path of debt, not just its
steady-state behavior.
Do we care about the short-run path of debt? To address this question,
we must go beyond the model and ask why debt matters. A high debt-
income ratio is dangerous because investors may start to fear default,
sparking a ﬁnancial crisis (Ball and Mankiw 1995). Higher debt at a point
in time might increase this danger, even holding constant the long-run be-
havior of debt. Investors are more likely to panic when they hold more
debt, because they have more to lose from an immediate default. However,
the importance of this eﬀect is unclear. The case for money-ﬁnanced trans-
fers is not as compelling as some economists suggest.6
7.6.3 A Permanent Monetary Expansion
In the previous experiment, the increase in money that ﬁnances transfers
is reversed in the long run. This fact follows from the conventional as-
sumption that the central bank eventually follows a Taylor rule. However,
the reversal of the monetary expansion diﬀers from some economists’ sug-
gestions. Bernanke, for example, advocates money-ﬁnanced transfers for
which “much or all of the increase in the money stock is viewed as perma-
nent.” Here I consider such a policy. As one might guess, the policy pre-
vents the debt-income ratio from jumping up at any point. Unfortunately,
it also produces hyperinﬂation.
Speciﬁcally, I assume again that transfers are governed by equation (8),
and that they are ﬁnanced by money creation. Monetary policy after the
transfers is the same as in earlier experiments, except for a constraint: open
market purchases must be nonnegative. That is, after the money stock rises,
it can never fall. This constraint ﬁrst binds in year eleven, when the Taylor-
rule interest rate becomes positive. When the Taylor rule implies Zt 0, the
central bank sets Zt   0 instead.
Figure 7.8 shows the eﬀects of this policy. Through year nine we see the
same eﬀects of money-ﬁnanced transfers as before. In year ten, the Taylor
rule starts calling for large open market sales, but they do not occur. Con-
Fiscal Remedies for Japan’s Slump 295
6. Goodfriend (2000) and Suda (2003) argue that a monetary expansion to ﬁnance trans-
fers would eventually have to be reversed, with adverse ﬁscal consequences. Their arguments
anticipate the results of this section.
Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004) present a model in which expansionary open market opera-
tions reduce debt permanently. This result contradicts my ﬁnding that monetization of debt
is irrelevant in the long run. The diﬀerences between Auerbach-Obstfeld’s results and mine
arise from diﬀerent assumptions about inﬂation. In the Auerbach-Obstfeld model, a mone-
tary expansion causes inﬂation to rise, reducing real government debt, even when the interest
rate is zero. After that, inﬂation falls without a fall in output. In my model, monetary policy
cannot aﬀect inﬂation at a zero interest rate, and a fall in inﬂation requires lower output and
tax revenue.sequently, the money-income ratio stays high and the nominal interest rate
stays at zero. The failure to tighten policy causes output and inﬂation to
rise. At this point, the economy enters an unstable spiral: higher inﬂation
reduces the real rate, which raises output, which further raises inﬂation.
Without reducing money, the central bank cannot raise the interest rate to
abort this process. Inﬂation reaches 7 percent in year ﬁfteen and 90 percent
in year twenty-ﬁve, and keeps rising forever.7
BOJ oﬃcials have criticized the idea of money-ﬁnanced transfers on the
grounds that they would eventually produce high inﬂation. Figure 7.8
shows a scenario in which this fear is realized. We have seen that policy-
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7. Eventually inﬂation reduces the money-income ratio suﬃciently that the nominal inter-
est rate starts rising. However, it rises more slowly than inﬂation, so the real rate falls forever.
Fig. 7.8 A permanent monetary expansion: output gap; inﬂation; nominal interest
rate; OMO/GDP; monetary base/GDP; debt/GDPmakers can prevent this outcome by reducing the money stock when inﬂa-
tion starts rising. But this action reverses the ﬁscal gain that money ﬁnance
is intended to achieve.
7.7 Robustness
This section considers the robustness of my results. I ﬁrst vary the
model’s parameters, and then consider broader changes in assumptions.
The chapter’s main conclusions are fairly robust. A ﬁscal expansion al-
ways produces a faster output recovery. The long-run eﬀects on the debt-
income ratio vary across speciﬁcations. In most cases, however, a ﬁscal ex-
pansion reduces debt below its level under passive policy. In some cases, this
gain is large. At worst, a ﬁscal expansion raises long-run debt by a small
amount.
7.7.1 The Neutral Real Rate
As discussed in section 7.3, Japan’s neutral real interest rate appears to
be negative, but is unlikely to stay negative forever. So far, I have assumed
the neutral rate r∗ starts at –2 percent and rises linearly to  2 percent over
ten years. Here I continue to assume r∗rises linearly from –2 percent to  2
percent, but vary the speed of this rise. A fast increase in r∗ means the IS
curve shifts out quickly.
A faster increase in r∗ weakens the case for ﬁscal expansion. This is il-
lustrated by ﬁgure 7.9. Like ﬁgure 7.6, this ﬁgure compares the economy’s
evolution with passive policy and with the ﬁscal rule (8). But it assumes
that r∗ rises to  2 percent in ﬁve years rather than ten. Fiscal expansion
still raises output, but its eﬀects on debt are a bit less favorable than before.
The debt-income ratio in year twenty-ﬁve is about one percentage point
higher with the expansion than without.
This result reﬂects the eﬀects of the r∗ path on output. If r∗ rises more
quickly, then output recovers more quickly in the case of passive policy.
This reduces the beneﬁts of ending the initial slump with a ﬁscal expansion.
There are smaller output gains, and hence smaller revenue gains to oﬀset
the initial cost of the expansion.
Figure 7.10 considers a range of paths for r∗. I assume this parameter
rises linearly from –2 percent to  2 percent in n years, and vary n from one
to twenty. For each n, the ﬁgure shows the debt-income ratio in year twenty-
ﬁve with passive policy and with a ﬁscal expansion. The expansion raises
the debt-income ratio for n   6, but only by modest amounts. The costs of
expansion when n is small are lower than the gains when n is large.
7.7.2 Equation Coeﬃcients
Table 7.3 examines robustness to varying the coeﬃcients in the model’s
equations—the IS and Phillips curves and the debt equation. Starting from
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that are twice as large and half as large. For each variation, table 7.3 reports
the debt-income ratio in year twenty-ﬁve with passive policy and with a ﬁs-
cal expansion.8
Not surprisingly, a key coeﬃcient is  , the ﬁscal multiplier. A larger mul-
tiplier means a smaller transfer is needed to return output to potential.
This reduces the debt-income ratio in the case of expansionary policy. Re-
call that the base value of   is 1.25; for this value, the debt-income ratio in
year twenty-ﬁve is 5 points lower with expansionary policy than with pas-
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Fig. 7.9 A faster rise in r∗: output gap; inﬂation; nominal interest rate; OMO/
GDP; monetary base/GDP; debt/GDP
8. As I vary the model coeﬃcients, I also vary the coeﬃcients in the central bank’s interest
rate rule, equation (7). As discussed in section 7.4, the coeﬃcients in equation (7) are chosen
so that inﬂation moves halfway to its target each period. The coeﬃcients deﬁned by this rule
are functions of the IS and Phillips-curve coeﬃcients.sive policy. This gain rises to 9 points for   2.5, but it falls to –3 points for
  0.625. The gain is positive for all   0.76.
When the other coeﬃcients change, the ﬁscal gains from transfers are ro-
bust. Transfers raise the long-run debt ratio in only one case (  0.3), and
then by a trivial amount. Often transfers reduce debt by large amounts
(e.g., 41 percent of GDP for   0.4).
7.7.3 Perpetual Deﬁcits
So far I have assumed the government’s primary budget is balanced if
output is at potential and the transfers G are zero. This assumption does
not ﬁt Japan today. There is a large primary deﬁcit, which is only partly
cyclical. It appears this deﬁcit would be about 5 percent of GDP if output
were at potential.
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Table 7.3 Varying the parameter values
Debt/GDP in year 25
With baseline policy With ﬁscal transfer
δ = 0.625 0.77 0.79
δ = 2.5 0.77 0.68
β = 0.5 0.67 0.66
β = 2 1.13 0.81
λ = 0.3 0.66 0.67
λ = 1.2 [very large] 0.86
α = 0.01 0.65 0.64
α = 0.125 0.73 0.72
θ = 0.5 0.85 0.71
Fig. 7.10 Varying the path of r∗This fact can be captured by adding a term to the debt equation, (6). The
equation becomes
(9) Dt   Dt 1   it 1Dt 1   P tGt   Zt    (P tY t   P tYt ∗)   (0.05)P tYt ∗.
The last term is the primary deﬁcit when output is at potential.
This modiﬁcation does not change the behavior of output or inﬂation,
but it does aﬀect the debt path. For base parameter values, ﬁgure 7.11
shows this path for the cases of passive and expansionary ﬁscal policy. In
both cases the debt-income ratio rises forever. A permanent budget deﬁcit
leads to disaster.
However, ﬁscal expansion still compares favorably to passive policy.
Starting in year two, the debt-income ratio is always smaller with the ex-
pansion. This policy does not eliminate the underlying deﬁcit problem, but
it slows the growth of debt.
7.7.4 A Textbook Phillips Curve
The main model assumes that expected inﬂation cannot fall below zero.
Here I assume that expected inﬂation equals past inﬂation, even if past in-
ﬂation is negative:
(10)  t
e    t 1.
This assumption and equation (2) produce an accelerationist Phillips
curve:
(11)  t    t 1   .






Fig. 7.11 Perpetual deﬁcitsFigure 7.12 shows how this modiﬁcation aﬀects the economy under alter-
native policies.
The largest changes occur for the case of no ﬁscal expansion—the solid
line in the ﬁgure. In this case, the output slump leads to a deﬂationary spi-
ral. Low output reduces inﬂation, which raises the real interest rate, which
further reduces output. Inﬂation and output head to minus inﬁnity. With
an accelerationist Phillips curve, passive policy is disastrous.
The dashed line in ﬁgure 7.12 shows the eﬀects of the ﬁscal rule (8). The
outcomes from this policy are better than from passive policy, but still not
good. Inﬂation falls to –4 percent and then remains at that level. The nom-
inal interest rate stays at zero, and the real rate rises to  4 percent. The
economy stays in a liquidity trap. To keep output at potential, as required
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Fig. 7.12 A textbook Phillips curve: output gap; inﬂation; nominal interest rate;
OMO/GDP; monetary base/GDP; debt/GDPby rule (8), the government must provide transfers forever. This causes the
debt-income ratio to rise without bound.
In this version of the model, a more aggressive ﬁscal expansion is better.
The dotted line in ﬁgure 7.12 shows what happens if the transfer in year one
is 15 percent of potential output, rather than 7 percent as dictated by equa-
tion (8). This transfer creates a boom in year two, pushing inﬂation from –
4 percent to –2 percent in year three. With 2 percent inﬂation, the real in-
terest rate is low enough for the economy to escape the liquidity trap. Even-
tually a nonnegative output gap can be sustained without transfers. The
debt income ratio peaks at 0.91 in year twenty-six and then falls.
7.7.5 A Forward-Looking Real Interest Rate
The main model is backward-looking—there is no role for expectations
of future variables. Here I introduce some forward-looking behavior. I de-
ﬁne the real interest rate as the nominal rate minus expected future inﬂa-
tion, not current inﬂation. Since the model is nonstochastic, expected in-
ﬂation equals actual future inﬂation. The real interest rate is
(12) r t   it    t 1.
This variation has only minor eﬀects on the results. Once again, a ﬁscal
expansion ends the output slump and reduces long-run debt. The debt-
income ratio in year twenty-ﬁve is 0.73 with ﬁscal expansion and 0.79 with
passive policy.
7.8 Conclusion
This chapter examines the eﬀects of ﬁscal transfers in a model of the
Japanese economy. Initial conditions are set to capture Japan’s slump as of
2003. I determine the level of transfers needed to return output to potential,
and the eﬀects on inﬂation and the debt-income ratio. I assume that mone-
tary policy follows a Taylor rule once the interest rate becomes positive.
A quick output recovery requires transfers totaling 9.4 percent of po-
tential GDP over four years. After the recovery, the Taylor rule guides the
economy to a steady state with output at potential and 2 percent inﬂation.
If the transfers are ﬁnanced with bonds, they cause the debt-income ratio
to jump up. After that, the ratio falls rapidly due to higher growth, inﬂa-
tion, and tax revenue. In steady state, the debt-income ratio is lower than
in a baseline case with no transfers. Thus the transfers produce a win-win:
they end the output slump and reduce Japan’s long-run ﬁscal problem.
I also consider transfers ﬁnanced with money rather than debt. The ﬁ-
nance method does not inﬂuence the paths of output or inﬂation. It also
does not aﬀect the debt-income ratio in steady state, because the initial
monetization of debt is eventually reversed. However, money ﬁnance pre-
vents the initial run-up of debt that occurs with bond-ﬁnanced transfers.
302 Laurence BallThus money ﬁnance is preferable if policymakers care about short-run as
well as long-run debt levels.
The results in this paper capture the ideas of some Japan-watchers. For
example, in discussing the downgrade of Japan’s debt, Thomas Byrne of
Moody’s argues that Japan needs a ﬁscal expansion:
Japan can’t consolidate its way out of this (debt problem), it has to grow
its way out. Any policy that ends deﬂation and stimulates growth (is
good). A ﬁscal policy that didn’t include a lot of wasteful spending may
present near-term anxiety but, if it really did stimulate growth, it would
be good over the long term. (Pilling 2002)
Byrne suggests that the long-run ﬁscal beneﬁts from expansionary policy
would outweigh the costs, as this paper ﬁnds. The “near-term anxiety” he
mentions is presumably caused by the temporary rise in debt from a bond-
ﬁnanced expansion. Thus Byrne also provides a rationale for money ﬁ-
nance, which reduces debt in the short run.
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Comment Mitsuru Iwamura
Government’s Intertemporal Budget Constraint
The model discussed in the chapter is very simple, and contains no for-
ward-looking expectations. This is not a serious shortcoming of the chap-
ter. In most cases, backward-looking expectations are enough and even
more realistic. However, this may not be good if we discuss the Japanese ﬁs-
cal problem in the last ten years.
The Japanese government conducted a series of ﬁscal stimulus during
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University.the 1990s. Through the series of ﬁscal package, we have learned several im-
portant things as follows.
(1) Simple Ricardian equivalence does not hold, so ﬁscal stimulus has
some impacts on the economic activity.
(2) The eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal stimulus depends on the level of the exist-
ing public debt. If the level of public debt is very high, ﬁscal stimulus be-
comes less powerful. In an extreme case, ﬁscal expansion leads to a de-
crease in private consumption. Some empirical papers report that this
mechanism did exist in the latter half of the 1990s.
(3) Temporary and permanent ﬁscal expansions have diﬀerent impacts.
If it is permanent, it has a larger impact on the economic activity. However,
if it is temporary, its impact is very limited. A famous example is “Shopping
Coupon” or CHIIKI-SHINKOKEN in March 1999, in which the govern-
ment delivered a coupon of about 20,000 yen to each family. This was a one-
time money transfer. It had some eﬀects on the consumers’ behavior, but its
impact was very small. People recognized well that this was a temporary
transfer, so that they did not revise much their permanent income.
These three things have important implications about the value of   in
the IS equation, equation (1). Ball assumes that   is equal to 1.25. I am not
quite sure if this is an appropriate number in the case of the Japanese econ-
omy in the last ﬁve years. Before deciding the value of  , we have to be very
careful about how it depends on the level of public debt, and whether the
ﬁscal shock is a temporary one or a permanent one.
Monetary Expansions and Base Money Market
Ball compared a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion and a money-ﬁnanced
ﬁscal expansion, and then he concluded monetization has no eﬀect on out-
put or inﬂation. However, suppose that the government and the central
bank implement a money-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion, so the supply of base
money increases. I wonder what will happen on the demand for base
money. Simply speaking, the demand for base money depends on the nom-
inal interest rate. In the situation discussed in this chapter, the short-term
nominal interest rate is zero, but the medium- or long-term interest rate is
probably above zero. Therefore, if the medium- or long-term nominal in-
terest rate falls in response to the money-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion, people
demand more base money, and consequently the market-clearing condi-
tion for base money is satisﬁed. In contrast, if the medium- or long-term
nominal interest rates do not decline, the demand for base money does not
increase, so that we have an excess supply in base money market.
This argument indicates that what is essentially important to escape
from the liquidity trap is not monetary expansion itself, but a decline in the
medium- or long-term nominal interest rate. If we think in this way, we can
make a good connection between Ball’s argument and the arguments made
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this chapter, the main source of a liquidity trap is a substantial decline in
the neutral rate, or equivalently the natural rate of interest. Then the issue
is how to lower the real interest rate in accordance with its natural rate
counterpart. Given the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, we can
ﬁx this problem only by changing the expected rate of inﬂation or chang-
ing medium- or long-term nominal interest rates.
Furthermore, Ball argued that a permanent monetary expansion might
produce hyperinﬂation, because such a permanent monetary expansion
shall be accompanied by a monetary policy avoiding raising the interest
rate forever. I fully agree with this argument and also emphasize the im-
portance of considerations to base money market-clearing condition.
Distinction between Money and Public Debt
Ball discussed that monetization might ease investors’ fear to default in
virtue of preventing the jump in the debt-income ratio. Regarding this, I
would call our attention to denomination of public debt.
If the public debt is denominated by foreign currency, the distinction be-
tween a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion and a money-ﬁnanced ﬁscal ex-
pansion is so vital. Huge amounts of government bonds denominated by
foreign currency are directly linked to the fear of default. Such experiences
are so common in the cases of Latin American debt problems.
On the other hand, if such a ﬁscal expansion is ﬁnanced by the home cur-
rency, fear to default depends on the relationship between the government
and the central bank. As long as there are no serious conﬂicts between
them, the central bank will purchase government bonds to cope with crises
in the money market caused by the accumulation of government debt.
Moreover, especially speaking about Japan, as government bonds occupy
67 percent of asset of the central bank (as of the end of March 2005), it is
unlikely that people distinguish between money and government bonds:
they must recognize these two are almost identical. They will not trust
money any more when they do not trust government bonds. And once
people cease to trust money, inﬂation will start to take place. Inﬂation is
not good, but it will reduce real debt burden, thereby removing the threat
of default.
Someone might say that money is good because the central bank is not
obliged to repay it. But this is simply wrong. If that is true, the government
is able to reduce debt burden just by repaying debts in terms of government
money. Needless to say, this is a wrong argument, because government bonds
and government money are both on the liability side of the government’s
balance sheet.
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